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In a white paper of the American Judges Association pub-lished in this journal, Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Lebenpresent a powerful case for using the principles of proce-
dural fairness:
Judges must be aware of the dissonance that exists
between how they view the legal process and how the
public before them views it. While judges should defi-
nitely continue to pay attention to creating fair out-
comes, they should also tailor their actions, language,
and responses to the public’s expectations of procedural
fairness. By doing so, these judges will establish them-
selves as legitimate authorities; substantial research sug-
gests that increased compliance with court orders and
decreased recidivism by criminal offenders will result.
Procedural fairness also will lessen the difference in how
minority populations perceive and react to the courts.1
They further summarized Professor Tom Tyler’s expecta-
tions of procedural fairness as:
• Voice: The ability to participate in the case by expressing
their viewpoint;
• Neutrality: consistently applied legal principles, unbiased
decision makers, and a “transparency” about how decisions
are made;
• Respectful treatment: individuals are treated with dignity
and their rights are obviously protected; and
• Trustworthy authorities: authorities are benevolent, caring,
and sincerely trying to help the litigants—this trust is gar-
nered by listening to individuals and by explaining or justi-
fying decisions that address the litigants’ needs. 2
These are laudable expectations.  If they can help opera-
tionally define the desirable characteristics of judges in a way
that the more ambiguous and abstract concepts, such as “judi-
cial temperament,” do not, they could help sitting judges
improve and could also help guide the public (in elective
states) and governors and legislators (in appointive states)
select new judges.
Many judges and academics have provided lists of the qual-
ities a good judge should have.  These usually include profes-
sional competence (legal abilities and intellect), integrity, and
judicial temperament (neutral, decisive, respectful, and com-
posed).  For example, in his essay, “What Makes a Good
Judge?,” Sir Gary Hickinbottom  divides the attributes of a
good judge into professional, personal, and administrative
components.3 Professional attributes include knowledge of
the law, legal analytic skills, “good judgment,” and intellectual
concentration, whereas personal attributes include such quali-
ties as integrity, objectivity, and temperament. 
Do the four basic “expectations” of procedural fairness
cover these desirable qualities of a judge?  My contention here
is that the role of courts has evolved over time and that the
role of judges has adapted to match the changing role of
courts.  Thomas Henderson and his colleagues have clearly
distinguished three adjudication processes—procedural, deci-
sional, and diagnostic—and have noted that all three, along
with variations on each, are used by contemporary courts in
varying combinations.4 Thomas Clarke and I have gone a
step further and suggested that court structures be modified
to be more congruent with adjudication processes.5 In any
event, the contention here is that different adjudication
processes require different judicial attributes and skills, and
that procedural fairness was developed with the image of the
traditional trial court in mind. So I ask:  Are procedural-fair-
ness concepts equally effective and applicable to judges serv-
ing in courts that do not fit the traditional image of trial
courts? 
PROCEDURAL ADJUDICATION AND 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The classic image of judge as neutral arbiter has its roots in
the adversary system. The very conception of courts, and
therefore the expectations we have of them, is derived from the
adversary process. The image of a court is that of a judge in a
trial setting. Even though trials are “vanishing”, i.e., becoming
a smaller and smaller portion of the way cases are resolved, tri-
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als provide the drama of courts and are the images that are tele-
vised and covered in the news.6
The adversary process assumes that there are two sides to
the case—perhaps rooted in the medieval process of trial by
combat.7 The core of the adversary system is the form of par-
ticipation accorded to the parties. Lon Fuller defines these as
the “institutionally protected opportunity to present proofs
and arguments for a decision in his favor.”8 Each side has the
opportunity to present arguments in his or her favor. Logically,
the requirement for the participant to be able to provide proofs
and arguments requires a neutral arbiter before whom to pre-
sent the arguments and a set of standards or laws so that the
litigants know the basis upon which the decision will be made.
Accordingly, the role of the judge in the adversary process is
to preside over the proceedings and maintain order.
Henderson and his colleagues called this process procedural
adjudication.  During a trial, the judge rules on whether any of
the evidence the parties want to use is illegal or improper. If
the trial is before a jury, the judge gives instructions about the
law that applies to the case; if the trial is before the court, the
judge determines the facts and decides the case. After the trial
(bench or jury), the judge may decide on damages or mete out
the sentence to the convicted. Note also the role of the judge
in this idealized conception—a very passive umpire enforcing
the procedural rules of the game. In the language of one recent
confirmation hearing, the judge’s role is a passive referee who
just “calls balls and strikes.”9
Procedural fairness comports well with the adversary
process.  Voice is the most important component of procedural
fairness, not only because it is important for litigants to have
their say in court but also because it shapes the other compo-
nents—neutrality, trust, and respect.10 The structure of the
adversary process provides ample opportunity for voice
because time is allotted for each side to tell their side of the
story before a decision is made. A trial in particular is a place
“where a citizen can effectively tell his own story publically in
a forum of power.”11 Moreover, the expectation of neutrality
—honest and impartial decision makers who base decisions on
consistent application of law to facts—is built into the role of
the judge in the adversary process as is the expectation that
defendants will be treated with
dignity and respect. 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Procedural fairness is also
compatible with the problem-
solving process. The idea of pro-
viding voice to litigants in a non-
adversarial setting was one of the
reasons this cooperative approach to dispute resolution was
created.  Particularly in family law, once a fertile source of tri-
als, there have been calls to abandon adversarial proceedings
“in favor of more informal approaches with the goal of encour-
aging parents to develop positive post-divorce co-parenting
relationships.”12
More recent “problem-solving” courts13 originated from the
efforts of “practical, creative, and intuitive judges and court
personnel, grappling to find an alternative to revolving door
justice, especially as dispensed to drug-addicted defendants.”14
From the opening of the first drug court in Dade County,
Florida, in 1989,15 drug courts spread rapidly based upon
anecdotal reports of success in reducing recidivism, as well as
the infusion of federal dollars. By the end of 2009, there were
2,459 drug courts and an additional 1,189 problem-solving
courts in the United States, including courts for DWI, mental
health, domestic violence, truancy, child support, homeless,
prostitution, reentry, and gambling.16
Problem-solving courts require judges to be more active,
less formal, and more personally engaged with each offender.
One New York Times article summarized: 
The judges often have an unusual amount of infor-
mation about the people who appear before them. These
people, who are often called clients, rather than defen-
dants, can talk directly to the judges, rather than com-
municating through lawyers. And the judges monitor
these defendants for months, even years, using a system
of rewards and punishments, which can include jail
time. Judges also receive training in their court’s spe-
cialty and may have a psychologist on the staff.17
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This personal involvement
creates a tension with the neu-
tral arbiter role of the judge and
sometimes leads to the charac-
terization of problem-solving
judges as “social workers” or
“therapists.”18 Problem-solving
judges are not neutral—they
hope that treatment succeeds.
They praise and sanction defen-
dants, rather than remain aloof,
but this active engagement
could create the perception that
they are not impartial. Some
may also consider collaboration
in “staffings,” where the judge
and treatment team meet in
advance of hearings to discuss
the offender’s progress in treatment and to reach consensus
about rewards and sanctions, to be in conflict with the neutral
arbiter judicial role.
Problem-solving courts would seem to be the ideal setting
for procedural fairness, especially voice, but stumbles on the
concept of neutrality because a judge cannot both give the
impression of neutrality and be a cheerleader for the success of
treatment.   
There is a way out of this dilemma, however—bifurcate
cases into adjudication and sentencing phases—”emphasize
traditional due process protections during the adjudication
phase of a case and the achievement of tangible, constructive
outcomes post-adjudication.”19 Especially in criminal cases
with a substance-abuse component, such as DWI cases, the full
adversary process with all of its due process protections could
be employed until guilt has been established. After guilt is
established, problem-solving principles designed to prevent
repeat offenses could be used to select the best sentencing
options, whether they be therapeutic or punitive.  If problem-
solving processes were used primarily after adjudication, pro-
cedural-fairness principles could be put into play for treat-
ment. 
DISPOSITIONAL ADJUDICATION AND 
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The use of procedural fairness principles for disposition-
oriented resolution of cases is more problematic because of the
focus on expeditious decision making. Although a small pro-
portion of  “important” cases are resolved by trial  (only about
2% in 2008), trials have never been the way most cases, even
felonies, were resolved. The justice system would simply break
down if most cases went to trial. Instead, most criminal cases
are resolved by plea agreements, and have been since the 19th
century. Civil cases are settled, and traffic cases and ordinance
violations are resolved by the payment of a fine. About 80% of
criminal cases are misdemeanors and most (more than 70%)
are handled in courts of limited jurisdiction by municipal
judges, justices of the peace, or magistrates.20 In the sense that
these lower criminal courts hear the bulk of criminal cases,
including disorderly conduct, drunkenness, prostitution, petty
theft, and simple assault cases, they are the courts with the
most contact with offenders, and it is in these courts that the
stereotype of “assembly line” justice was created. 21 One
Albany lawyer described the situation in the lower courts of
New York:
The biggest problem with our court system is the vol-
ume of cases. The volume is so large that the courts have
to rely on assembly line justice. It really is an assembly
line. The police officer prepares the initial papers and
files them with the clerk. The clerk gives the papers to
the prosecutor who reviews them and discusses the case
with the lawyer or the pro-se defendant. The papers then
go back to the clerk, who then hands them to the judge.
The judge calls the case. There’s a brief discussion at the
bench. Then the papers go back to the clerk, who then
processes the result (fine notice, schedule next date,
etc.). Think about this: If a court has 100 cases on for a
particular session (a typical number for courts like
Colonie, Guilderland, Albany, etc), and each case takes
15 minutes, that would take 25 hours. That’s not going
to work. If each case takes only 5 minutes, it still takes 8
hours, so that’s still not going to work. Most courts end
up at about 1-2 minutes per case. That’s assembly line
justice.22
These types of cases require facts to be established so that
the law can be quickly applied; sentences and financial penal-
ties are limited so that dispositions can be expeditious.23
Clearing the docket then becomes very important, and the task
becomes processing large numbers of individual cases, a more
bureaucratic process not unfamiliar to the executive branch of
government.  Judges must decide large numbers of lower-
stakes cases every day, rather than spend days or weeks mak-
ing a decision in one case at trial, and so the procedures must
be streamlined.  Consequently, judges may take a more active
role in all phases of case processing to ensure that the attor-
neys, many of whom may be court appointed, are devoting the
proper attention to their clients.  The point here is with that
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many cases to dispose of in such a short time, can lower court
judges really be expected to provide litigants with meaningful
voice—the ability to participate in a case by expressing their
viewpoint—and still keep ahead of their dockets?  Is there time
to express their caring, to explain and to justify their deci-
sions? In sum, is procedural fairness possible in high-volume
lower courts? 
With respect to judges, I think the answer is “no,” but there
is no reason why the principles of procedural fairness would
not apply to other court employees. A study conducted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts in California found that
experience with traffic and other low-stakes courts were a par-
ticular source of litigant dissatisfaction.24 Because judges have
such short interactions with litigants in these high-volume
courts, the way litigants are treated by court staff becomes
more important. 
In summation, the principles of procedural fairness were
created for an adversarial process and work well there.  They
can be adapted for the problem-solving process that happens
Court Review - Volume 47 95
after adjudication, but they can only be employed in the vast
numbers of ordinary, run-of-the-mill cases by court staff, not
by judges. 
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